One of the most startling phenomena of recent Philippine history has been the development of a popuiar movement calling for the relinquishing of Philippine sovereignty and for political re-union with the U.
Although the "statehood movement" was understandably treated as something of a joke when it first surfaced several years ago, its popular reception and rapid growth, especially in the face of surging Philippine nationalist and anti-imperialist sentiments, demands that the movement and the ideology which it represents be carefully analyzed.
It may well be that the statehood movement is a curio, a quirk in the Philippine body politic, a nostalgic last remembrance of colonialism, emerging now only to be inevitably and inexorably swept article source by the tide of history. These are comforting thoughts, but there remain some nagging doubts.
Philippine nationalism has, historically, been poorly defined. For a myriad of reasons, American colonialism as perceived by Filipinos has been qualitatively different from, say, Vietnamese perception of their read more with the French.
One must reluctantly conclude that perhaps the most serious cancer of twentieth-century Philippine society has been the traumatizing effect of mystification and false consciousness regarding the American colonial period. For the student of Philippine history, such a state of affairs is not merely discouraging or upsetting, it is tragic. This is true for many reasons, but it is especially true for one reason in particular.
The degree to which Filipino false consciousness exists is the measure of American success in obliterating from popular consciousness knowledge of what American historians have chosen to call when they refer to it at all, which is seldom the "Philippine Insurrection.
One prize of victory is that the winners get to write the history books. This was see more so true as it has been about the Philippine-American War, and this go here, more than any other, has denied to Filipinos all but the merest scraps of distorted information about one of the most heroic struggles ever waged in modern times; a struggle waged against implacable odds and at terrible cost.
The Philippine-American War, by which name it should properly be known, is one of those bits of historiography which-like the American Indian Wars-seems to have sunk beneath the surface of popular awareness.
And yet the Philippine-American War was one of those illuminating moments of history which threw a shaft of light on an era. As far as Filipinos are concerned, an understanding of our liberation struggle at the turn of the century is without question or doubt the prerequisite, the starting point for a genuine understanding of modern Philippine society. It is ironic that it has taken half a century and the remarkably similar situation in Indochina to re-focus attention on the Philippine struggle for national liberation against the forces of American imperial aggression.
In all, save the ultimate outcome, history has uncannily repeated itself in Vietnam, a fact which should be driven home to American apologists who hold that Vietnam is an "aberration" check this out U. Leaving aside the obvious fact that "mistake" is equated with being beaten, and the curious frequency with which imperialist "aberrations" seem to crop up, it is important for Filipinos to recognize that we must vindicate ourselves by comprehending our own history.
With such a view in mind and within the limits of this essay, attention will be focused on the three aspects of the war which are the most critical and yet, for reasons which are perhaps obvious, have attracted the least amount of attention, let alone analysis. Therefore, attention will not be focused so much on the war against Spain, which preceded the Philippine-American War, nor will it deal with the political infighting in the Malolos Government or General Emilio Aguinaldo's surrenderist prevarications.
Attention will be focused on the nature of America's policy of aggression, the depth of popular mass resistance to the American forces and the duration of the struggle in what became, ultimately, suicidal refusal to capitulate to imperialism. Spain never had an easy time in pacifying its Philippine colony and in the course of over three centuries of colonial rule, scarcely a year went by which did not witness rebellion in one form or another somewhere in the archipelago.
The fragmented, insular nature of the country and the separate regional, ethnic and language groupings made it difficult to coordinate a nationwide anti-Spanish struggle, but at times the Filipinos came close to achieving a broad united front against the foreign foe.
As early asfor example, a secret society was formed in Manila by Magat Salamat which spread throughout Central Luzon to the Visayas and as far south as Borneo. This early movement was not Essay About Biak Na Bato, however, and it was to be more than years before such unity of action was again achieved. Subsequent rebellions were commonly local or regional affairs, sparked by local conditions and grievances. Sometimes they lasted for a surprisingly long period of time, as in Bohol, where Spanish authority was denied for over eighty years.
The Islamic areas of Mindanao and Sulu were never really conquered. Spain was always able to exploit divisions in Philippine society in such a way as to prevent a coordinated Essay About Biak Na Bato struggle and this situation was maintained until the last decades of the nineteenth century. The rise of a native moneyed class, consisting mainly of Chinese-native or Indio mestizo elements, gave rise to a liberal reformist movement anxious Essay About Biak Na Bato win greater political and economic concessions from Spain.
The Propaganda Movement, as it came to be called, was essentially an assimilationist effort. Its leaders aimed, ultimately, at closer ties with Spain. It was during this time that the hispanized Chinese-mestizos began referring to themselves as Filipinos, a term previously reserved for Spaniards born in the colony. But the Propagandists made little headway against entrenched and often reactionary Spanish authority. The failure of the Propagandist efforts spurred the formation in of the Katipunan, a secret society which, after some initial indecision, began to recognize the futility of the earlier reformist efforts.
By independence became an increasingly realistic prospect. Spain was having a difficult time suppressing the Cubans, who were then in revolt, and her ability to sustain a similar effort in the Philippines was an open question.
By Katipunan ranks had swollen to 30, and fighting between the Katipunan forces and the Spanish commenced. The founder of the Katipunan, Andres Bonifacio, lost control over the organization in March when Emilio Aguinaldo was elected as the head of a newly formed Revolutionary Central Government. After Aguinaldo's victory the revolutionary forces became increasingly prone to vacillation and compromise as a number of frustrated elitist reformers began to attach themselves to the organization.
The older Katipuneros argued for the continuation of the military struggle along guerrilla lines, but the reformist more info assimilationist elements began to see the possibility of finally achieving their long-sought-after goals via negotiation.
After hesitancy and debate, a compromise treaty was negotiated in November by a wealthy mestizo, Pedro Paterno. Under the terms of the treaty, the Spanish governor general, Primo de Rivera, promised to consider the reformist demands in exchange for the surrender of the rebel army. Satisfied with such weak promises and even more by the promised initial payment of P, to himself and his staff, Aguinaldo and his men voluntarily exiled themselves to Hong Kong, but Spanish refusal to promulgate reforms led to agitation for a renewed military confrontation.
The Spanish, in fact, controlled only the area of the old walled city of Manila. Aguinaldo had, meanwhile, been intermittently negotiating with the Americans in Hong Kong and Singapore, and he returned to the Philippines to resume command of the Filipino forces with Dewey's sanction and with verbal assurances that the Americans Essay About Biak Na Bato aid the Filipinos in securing their independence.
A three-way stalemate persisted until August, Dewey in Manila Bay without forces to land, the Spanish holed up in the read article city, and the Filipinos dug in along the perimeter of the city. The Spanish decided they would rather surrender to the Americans than to the Filipinos and in August a bizarre, tragi-comic "battle" was quite literally staged between the Spanish and the Americans, ostensibly to preserve Spanish "honor"-although six died in the farce.
The resulting surrender terminated three centuries of Spanish colonialism and the American forces, newly reinforced, took possession of Manila. By autumn it was clear that the Americans intended to retain the Philippines as a Pacific colony. American troop strength was increasing and Admiral Dewey showed no Essay About Biak Na Bato of weighing anchor.
Battle lines around Manila continued to be drawn roughly as they had remained at the end of the mock battle against the Spanish in the previous August. The Americans held the city and had trenches along its perimeter, facing Filipino trenches along a semi-circle of several miles. Senate, which required a two-thirds majority vote as necessitated by the Constitution.
Voting on the treaty was scheduled for Monday, February 6, and during the week preceding it seemed fairly clear to most observers that the McKinley Administration was not likely to rally enough support in the Senate to win ratification. By implication, this put American retention of the Philippines in jeopardy. In the Philippines, insults-and occasionally shots-were being traded across the trenches by the two opposing armies throughout the month of January. But war did not come until the evening of February 4,when general fighting erupted all along the line.
The American command in Manila claimed at the time that the Filipinos initiated the fighting, but there seems little doubt that the Americans themselves started the war and as much was later admitted by U. That the outbreak of the war was carefully orchestrated to influence the outcome of the treaty vote in the Senate seems almost beyond question, and although initiating a war to influence the passage of legislation seems a tactic singularly lacking in subtlety, historically it seems to work and in this instance it proved successful.
The news of the fighting-and the false information as to its instigation- was wired to Washington and its dramatic effect persuaded the Senate to ratify the treaty by a margin of one vote. Although the Americans had been sending reinforcements to the Philippines throughout the fall of there were 21, U. But the Filipino troops were at a dreadful disadvantage owing to their lack of rifles.
Only one man in three had a gun; others fought with bolos and spears or simply waited to snatch up a rifle from a fallen comrade.
Thousands of Filipinos were killed in the first battle, hundreds more died soon after from wounds. For the Filipino patriots, the opening battle in what proved to be one of the longest and bloodiest wars in the sorry history of imperial aggression produced two sharp lessons.
It was clear that the Filipinos could not hope to survive by fighting on American terms of fixed position, set-piece battles in the classical military tradition. The Philippine Army was quickly forced to resort to mobile warfare where their click to see more perior knowledge of the terrain and the universal support they enjoyed among the people could be utilized to their advantage.
Although an overt policy of guerrilla war was not specifically enunciated until the following November, guerrilla tactics were employed out of necessity immediately after the initial rout at Manila. The first battle link indicated to the Filipinos that they were faced with a foe which gave no quarter and which was prepared to disregard the fundamental rules of warfare.
The Americans were contemptuous of Filipinos generally and they had little respect for the fighting ability of the Philippine Army.
They referred to the Filipinos as "niggers," "barbarians," and "savages," reflecting both the racist and imperialist attitudes of American society at large.
Essays - largest database of quality sample essays and research papers on Editoryal Na Tagalog Halimbawa. The Katipunan (usually abbreviated to KKK) was a Philippine revolutionary society founded by anti-Spanish Filipinos in Manila in , whose primary aim was to gain. It is easy to get caught up in the negativity of a government of the crass, by the crass, and for the crass. Mean-spirited men and women haunt the hallowed halls of. The s, which began on 1 January and ended on 31 December , were sometimes referred to as the "Mauve Decade" – because William Henry Perkin's aniline. *With apologies to Mexicans, American Indians and other early victims of American imperialism. Introduction. One of the most startling phenomena of recent Philippine.
The Americans were elated by their initial success and their commander, the rather wooden and unimaginative Gen. Elwell Otis, confidently predicted that the war would be ended in a matter of weeks. Otis had convinced himself that the opposition to U. This theme, which was trotted out by domestic U. After the devastating first battle, the Filipino Army retreated into Central Luzon, fighting rear-guard actions as it went. Malolos, capital of the Philippine Republic, quickly fell and within the conventional framework within which he was operating, Otis equated this event with the fall of the Philippine Government, which in turn would mean the surrender of the Philippine Army.
Or so he hoped. Confident predictions of imminent victory were forthcoming again and it was with some degree of dismay that click here Americans began to realize Essay About Biak Na Bato Aguinaldo considered his "capital" to be wherever he himself happened to be camped-which was Essay About Biak Na Bato just out of reach of the slow-moving American columns.
It was with a growing sense of uneasiness that the American command began to realize that the further they were drawn into Central Luzon and the more they had to disperse their forces, the more difficult it became to defend themselves against counter-attack, ambush, and harassment by the highly mobile Philippine Army, which was itself free of the need for the ponderous supply chain required by the Americans.
The odds, which were so disastrously against the Filipinos in early February, began to even up. There was another-and to the more perceptive American commanders, rather more disturbing-character to the fighting.
essay about biak na bato
It gradually dawned on the Americans that the reason the Filipino troops could move around so easily without concern for a supply base, and the reason information and advice were so difficult to elicit from the native population, were due to the fact that the Aguinaldo government and the Philippine nationalist cause had the total support of the Philippine masses.
They slowly began to realize that their major foe was not really the formally constituted, but in many ways ineffectual, Philippine Army; rather, it was the Filipino people, who, Essay About Biak Na Bato finally gotten rid of the Spanish, were unrelentingly and implacably hostile to American imperialist designs.
Usually no athlete bats an eye when they're invited to the White House to celebrate their monumental win, whether the World Series or Super Bowl. Gear up for the next NFL championship game when you wear this Super Bowl 51 Patriots Tom Brady Jersey. Brady himself didn't take a trip to the South of the Border, but his jersey did. In a statement today, Brady said he was happy that the case had come to a resolution. The revelations come following the deaths of Kate Goodchild, 32, her brother Luke Dorsett, 35, his partner Roozbeh Araghi, 38 and tourist Cindy Low, 42, on the ride on Tuesday.
The implications of this understanding were fully realized only later and in the bloodiest manner imaginable. But as early as AprilGeneral Shafter gave grisly portent to the future conduct of the war: The American command had presumably been taken in by its own press releases. Arthur MacArthur 8Otis's subordinate and later replacementcommented, " I believed that Aguinaldo's troops represented only a faction. I did not like to believe that the link population of Luzon-the native population, that is-was opposed to us With the approach of summer and with victory still beyond their grasp, the War Department began to suggest to Essay About Biak Na Bato that he might need more troops.
Embarrassed by his earlier confident predictions and even more so by his growing inability to produce tangible results, he at first declined the offer, but then he reversed himself and surprised the Department by asking for Essay About Biak Na Bato, more troops. Otis was limited by his textbook approach to war and failed to realize that American "victories" in which the Filipinos were "scattered" or "routed" were next to meaningless. Otis was, in keeping with the time-honored phrase, winning the battles but losing the war.
Few of the battles were actually more than skirmishes and hit-and-run affairs, but on June 10,in Laguna, Filipino Generals Ricarte and Noriel with 3, men caught an American division of 4, in a cross-fire ambush and cut it to pieces. Battles of this size became increasingly rare, just click for source. By October all the American reinforcements had arrived and it was decided that the best way to terminate the war was to capture Aguinaldo and his staff.
An ambitious three-pronged encirclement campaign, encompassing the whole of Central Luzon, was decided upon.